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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY DEATS, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) 
v . ) 
Case No. 860372 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, ) 
Defendant/Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 . Whether the jury verdict, when viewed In the light most favorable 
to the prevailing party, had evidence sufficient \o support it. 
2. Whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion in 
denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial. 
3. Whether it was prejudicial to give jury instruction No. 25. 
DETERMINATIVE RULE IN THE CASE 
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (See, Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE fcASE 
Commenced this action against 
On March 18, and 20, 1986, 
On or about September 24, 1984, plaintiff 
defendant Commercial Security Bank ("CSB"). 
the above-entitled action was tried before a juijy of 8 members. The jurors 
were read 39 jury instructions by the Honorable David E. Roth, including 
Instruction No. 25, which is the sole instruction relief upon by plaintiff for 
purposes of her appeal. (See, Attachment , !A.n) The jury was instructed on 
current Utah law concerning the defendant's burden of proof, the doctrine of 
267d 
comparative negligence and the jury was requested to return a special verdict 
which accurately reflected Utah law and their verdict. On March 20, 1986, 
the jury returned a special verdict finding that CSB was not negligent 
and the appropriate judgment was entered on April 8, 1986. Plaintiff did not 
object to the jury verdict form or the jury's verdict prior to the time the 
jury was discharged. On or about April 14, 1986, CSB filed Notice of Entry 
of Judgment pursuant to Rule 58, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. On April 
17, 1986, plaintiff filed her Motion for New Trial with an accompanying 
memorandum in support and the affidavits of jurors Julia Etcheverry and 
Charles Sweet, the two jurors who had not concurred with the other six 
jurors. On June 2, 1986, the plaintiffs Motion for a New Trial was heard 
and denied by the Court. Plaintiffs Notice of Appeal was filed on or about 
July 7, 1986. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On Monday, February 27, 1984, plaintiff drove up the three ramps in 
the CSB parking lot and found a place to park on the fourth level at 
approximately 7:05 a.m. (T . at 69, 71 , 73 and 125.) Plaintiffs car slid while 
driving up the parking ramps and she walked very carefully because she 
could see how very, very icy it was while walking away from her parking 
place. ( T . at 72-73, 78-79 and 125.) Plaintiff arrived at work prior to 
business hours and the time that most persons that used the parking lot 
arrived. (T . at 70, 163-164 and 193.) Plaintiff arrived prior to sunrise at a 
time when the coldest temperatures are commonly recorded. ( T . at 213.) On 
that Monday morning, following a winter snowstorm, plaintiff was the first 
2 
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person to arr ive at the parking lot. (T a't 69 70 at id 125 ) In ideed, 
plaintiff stated that another person was not expected to a r r i v e for 25 
n i l n u l e s , , I II if "II I "11,) 
After the plaintiff had parked her car and was wa lk ing towards the 
stairwell to exit the parking terrace, she thought about I slippery * '-
in in ::!! 11! i a t ill:III e i next cai tha t came ip I hie t-
K ner 79 . ) Accordingly plaintiff turned aroun . •*. , .. ^ -
' careful ly , because :»i " t! le icy conditions, back toward her car •* - ; 
Dace ( 1 at 79 80 ) !i| s plain itiff appr oacl e> ::1 ft ic froi it 
of her - slipped ai id fell ( 1 at 80 ) Ai i ir idividual if i a air i was oi \ 
-* t o r -, *• . * -f lot to spread salt or sand by the time plaintiff had 
a mi in c:l v i" a s a g a i i i s 111: a r \ ell i i \ g i i p r i g 1 i 111: s o i n i e v\ Il i e f e lb e 1: w e e n 
• -- • l[ I a t 82 84 ar id 130 1 3 1 . ) Plain i t i f f proceeded back 
down the stairwell from the four th level and across the str eet to wor k , where 
nail in l e d m mi itiill latei 1:1 mat a f te i i noon t, ( I at 85 ) 
CSB did r lot ha\ e a gate or otll lei barr ier to prevent individuals from 
parking iii \ the lot A If iei i the parking attendant was not or i di i ty.
 v • • at 
17 6 1 7 7 ) 1 1 11: i s C S B \ v a s a'< \ a i e 11 i a 1: p e r s o i i s p a i I <: e d i i i t i i e I o 1: a t various 
! nours of the night or ear lorning without paying. [1 at 189-190 and 
203.) Plaint i f fs assertit ^ '**••- ^ reasonable alternative but to park 
iii i her i lesiiji iatPtJ spnl "A.ii1hi l ln : i indent v. presented .it 
t r ia l , I I .it 141 , i 4 r i . ) 
3 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
shows that CSB was not negligent in failing to maintain a safe parking lot 
and/or failing to notify plaintiff of the alleged dangerous condition in the 
parking terrace. Plaintiff failed to show that CSB was negligent in that its 
employees knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that 
a dangerous condition existed on that date at 7:05 a .m. , and that sufficient 
time elapsed thereafter that action could have been taken to correct the 
dangerous condition, if any existed. Therefore, this Court should not 
overturn the jury verdict, since substantial prejudicial error or injustice has 
not been established by plaintiff. 
Similarly, the trial court's denial of plaintiffs motion for a new trial was 
not based upon evidence in support of the verdict which was completely 
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly 
unreasonable and unjust. Accordingly, this Court must affirm the trial 
court's denial of the motion for a new trial, since plaintiffs conclusory 
allegations that the jury verdict was improper do not constitute a showing of 
a clear abuse of discretion. 
Jury Instruction No. 25 is an accurate statement of current Utah law 
despite the advent of comparative negligence, and plaintiffs own testimony at 
trial established that the icy conditions were well-known to plaintiff and 
constituted an obvious or plainly seen dangerous condition within the meaning 
of Instruction No. 25. Moreover, plaintiff improperly attempts to impeach the 
jury verdict through affidavits which do not allege sufficient grounds. 
4 
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evidence supporting 
evidence in a light * -
to support it Sch «* 
Similarly, the Court 
f
 favorable 
i i iV 
\ndersor 
ARGUMENT I 
THE JURY VERDICT u. .w NEGLIGENCE WAS SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND ~,n> NOT CONSTITUTE SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR OR INJUSTICE 
Plaintiff contend* ^ ''•* , verdict that CSB was not negligent 
supported i --- u^ <
 t , resented at trial. Howevei , " fa] party 
claiming cai n lies c ! ic 
burden." Von Hake v Thomas, 705 P.2d 76* (Utah 1985). ,.i 
particulai , to overturn a jury verdict "ait appellant must marshal the 
j
*>e 
Krjt erdict, the evidence is insufficient 
*d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)" l^. 
Toone, 671 I- 1: 2 (I Itai! i 1983), 
found that ar i appellate court should "review the ji iry's verdict in 4 U a "ight 
e to the prevailing par ty . Lamkin v . Lynch, Utah, 600 :.< 530 
(1979 i accord the evidence presented and every reasonable ? •<. e 
fairly u * • therefrom the same degree of deference." See also, Von 
Hake . nomas, supra Ii i Bezi lei * Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc. , 548 
D -><-! ,4 " H h 1Q76), defendants appealed a jury verdict: f inding defendants 
liable * i ^
 sr isir ig out of the sale of a dry cleaning business. The 
• • i • - standard for r eviewing a jury : verdict as follows: 
Notwithstanding our prerogative of reviewing both the facts and the 
law in equity cases, the general rule which we frequently have 
occasion to state and apply is that we indulge the presumption of 
verity to the findings of a jury and the actions of the trial court 
thereon; and that we will not disturb them unless it appears that 
there is substantial prejudicial error , or that the evidence so clearly 
preponderates against them that we ai e persuaded that an injustice 
has resulted. 
Id , at 901. 
5 
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The evidence, viewed in a light favorable to the verdict, shows that 
CSB was not negligent in failing to maintain a safe parking terrace and/or 
failing to notify plaintiff of the alleged dangerous condition in the parking 
terrace. The evidence adduced at trial indicated: that plaintiff need not have 
parked on the fourth floor of the parking terrace; that plaintiff arrived prior 
to the time the sun rose and while the parking lot was being maintained; at 
the time plaintiff slipped and fell an individual was already salting or sanding 
the parking terrace (which indicates that CSB was already maintaining the lot 
prior to the normal arrival hour for invitees to the parking lot); and that she 
was the first parker to arrive in the lot that day. 
The only recent case where the Court has examined the potential liability 
of a private property owner for business invitees who slip and fall on the 
owner's property was Martin v\ Safeway Stores, Inc. , 565 P.2d 1139 (Utah 
1977). The Court noted that a property owner's liability "should be 
established only when the condition complained of has existed for a long 
enough time that the owner should have known about it and corrected it, or 
has had actual knowledge of the condition complained of." ]cL at 1140. The 
Court found as follows: 
The essential inquiry relating to defendant's negligence is 
whether the defendant's employees know, or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known that a dangerous condition 
existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed thereafter that action 
could have been taken to correct the situation. Owners of stores, 
banks, office buildings, theaters or other public buildings where 
the public is invited to come on business or for pleasure are not 
insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen to any who 
come. 
Id. 
6 
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ji, i ry1^ ^ ; • *• -air.-._i •••* negl igence ••• • " t v ' of CSB, -• -.'^-?r-, su f f ic ie r * u 
s u p p o r : v e r d i c t l a ln t i f f ' s conc lusory asser t ion tha t 
nn i ted i: \ !:! HE • facts :::ai :>II il} be ji j s t i f ied i f ihnj u>ur I 
cons iders ev idence which cont ravenes or does not s u p p o r t the jur y v e r d i c t . 
ARGUMENT 11 
THE ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW T R I A L WAS PROPER1 i Ft 11 R l n 
AND WAS NOT A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION, 
PLAINLY UNREASONAB1 E AND t INJI 1ST 
P la in t i f f l ikewise b u r d e n to bear to o v e r t u r n ?a =-,-?•* * 
denial of a motion In Goddard \ H ickman, 685 !" 
liV2 11 If.i l l s tated t ha t t r i a l cou r t s have "b road latitude-
g r a n t i n g eny ing a motion *" - new t r i a l , and •: be ove r t u rned -• 
appeal absen4 « • v ^ r * . * i s c r e t i o n . " The O 
T r u j i l l o , U\ , found tha t the t r i a l cou r t »-*v :••-*>•- , 
new t r ia l s tandard tha t fcot near lv as s t r i c t *c ^ , P standard i-
appel late review of ar i o rder deny inq a n^w i n a l * »ted 
that HI d i f f e r e n t s tandard appl ies when the appeal is " w
 ; n e ^ v * a motion 
for a f lew t r ia l than tor an appeal where the motion * r • t r ia l was 
grantee i Anderson "» lmnn-\ sup ra , 'I l / l * ' t - !IH« 
sta* oel late review where the t r ia l c o u r t has denieo - •" ? . \r a 
new t r i a l as fo l lows: '• ' • 
• The t r i a l cou r t has wide d isc re t ion to g r a n t or deny a motion 
for a i iew t r ia l and we do not reverse a denial unless the "ev idence 
to s u p p o r t the v e r d i c t was completely lack ing or was so s l i gh t and 
unconv inc ing as to make the v e r d i c t p la in l y unreasonable and 
un jus t " Nelson v . T r u j i t l o , U t a h , 657 P.2d 730 (1982). 
7 
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Plaintiff has failed to show, and cannot show, that the trial court's 
denial of the motion for a new trial was based upon a jury verdict that was 
plainly unreasonable and unjust. CSB was not negligent in failing to maintain 
a safe parking terrace and/or failing to notify plaintiff of the claimed 
dangerous condition, since a maintenance person was already on site at the 
time of the slip and fall, prior to regular business hours, in a lot that could 
not be closed at night, which shows sufficient time had not elapsed for 
corrective action. See, Martin v . Safeway Stores, Inc. , supra, at 1140. 
ARGUMENT II I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25 WAS A PROPER STATEMENT OF THE LAW AND 
CANNOT BE IMPEACHED BY JUROR AFFIDAVITS 
Plaintiff asserts that a new trial is justified on the grounds that the trial 
court, over plaintiffs objection, instructed the jury in accordance with 
Instruction No. 25. Plaintiff contends that the Affidavits from two of the 
jury members show that the jury did not attempt to assess the amount of 
negligence that may have been attributable to CSB or plaintiff. In Rosenlof 
v . Sullivan, 676 P.2d 372, 375 (Utah 1983), the defendant alleged that the 
trial court erred in awarding damages, based upon the jury foreman's 
affidavit. However, the Court found that it had previously "interpreted Rule 
59(a)(2) to allow an affidavit by a juror to Impeach the verdict only when the 
verdict was determined by chance or bribery." (citations omitted) In 
addition, the Court stated the reasons for restricting the circumstances when 
jury affidavits were permissible to impeach a verdict as follows: 
To permit litigants to get jurors to sign affidavits or testify to 
matters discussed in connection with their functions as jurors would 
open the door to inquiry into all manner of things which a losing 
litigant might consider improper: misconceptions of evidence or law, 
8 
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offers of settlement, personal experiences, prejudice against 
lit igants or their causes or the classes td which they belong. It 
would be an interminable and totally impractical process. Such 
post-mortems would be productive of no end of mischief and render 
service as a juror unbearable. If jurors were so circumscribed in 
their deliberations, i t is l ikely that judge and counsel would have to 
be present in the ju ry room attempting to monitor and regulate 
their thought and discussions into approved channels. Fortunately, 
jurors are under no such l imitation, but are allowed freedom in 
their deliberations. 
j d . (quoting Wheat v . Denver & R.C.W.R. Co.
 f 122 Utah 481, 250 P.2d 932, 
937 (1952)). 
In Johnson v . Simons, 551 P.2d 515 (Utah 
tr ial court 's denial of a motion for a new t r i a l , despite the aff idavits of 
members of the j u ry asserting that the ju ry failed to understand the tr ial 
court 's instruct ions, or that i t disregarded the instructions in ar r iv ing at the 
verd ic t . The Court stated as follows: 
aff idavit of one of the 
1976), the Court affirmed the 
A misconduct may be shown by the 
ju ro rs . No claim is made here that the verdict was determined by 
chance or that it was the result of b r ibery . The defendants and 
appellants here do not claim misconduct within the meaning of Rule 
59(a)(2) . The ju ry may not be permitted to impeach the verdict 
returned by i t , and aff idavits by jurors 
the contrary, 
are inadmissible to show 
k i . at 516. 
In the present case the plaint i f f has not a 
which would constitute a decision by chance or 
the aff idavits hearsay or mental impressions of 
aff idavits by Mr. Sweet and Ms. Etcheverry are inadmissible. Plaintiff has 
not established, as she must, that the st renipus objection of counsel was 
specific and made on proper grounds. In Lanjkin v . Lynch, 600 P.2d 530, 
lleged misconduct by the jury 
b r ibery . Hence, not only are 
the remaining six ju rors , the 
533 (Utah 1979), the Court noted that pursuant to Rule 51, Utah Rules of 
9 
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Civil Procedure, an appellant's objection to a jury instruction must be 
"specific enough to give the trial court notice of every error in the 
instruction complained of on appeal," Plaintiff's implicit allegation that the 
verdict may have been ambiguous is not a sufficient ground for appeal or a 
motion for a new trial, since special verdicts that are ambiguous must be 
objected to before the jury is discharged to avoid the expense and additional 
time for a new trial. Bennion v . LeCrand Johnson Construction Co., 701 
P.2d 1078, 1083 (Utah 1985). 
Additionally, plaintiff asserts that jury Instruction No. 25 is an incorrect 
statement of law. The instruction is derived from the case of Whitman v . W. 
T . Grant Co. , 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 P.2d 778, 779 (1967), wherein the Court 
stated as follows: 
The plaintiff is confronted with the basic proposition that when 
there is a hazard which is plainly visible, ordinarily one is charged 
with the duty of seeing it and avoiding it. And if he fails to do 
so, it is concluded that he was negligent either in failing to look, 
or in failing to heed what he saw. 
In Whitman, the Court was quoting from the prior case of Richards v. 
Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 P.2d 59 (1959). The above-referenced principle 
of law was thereafter relied on in McAllister v\ Bybee, 19 Utah 2d 40, 425 
P.2d 778, 779 (1967), wherein the Court noted that this proposition had been 
cited in at least six prior decisions. 
Similarly, in Pollesche v . K-Mart Enterprises of Utah, inc. , 520 P.2d 200 
(Utah 1974), the Court stated that "[t]here would be no useful purpose in 
citing supporting authorities just for the common sense rule that he should 
look and having the clear onus and ability to see, does not see, or he who 
looks and sees, but ignores such clear onus and ability is guilty of 
10 
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contributory negligence as a matter of law, albejt normally the determining of 
such negligence is the prerogative of the jury." ]cL at 203. In recent 
decisions by this Court, the principle found in 
reaffirmed by the Court. In Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 
1978), the Court restated the notion that a plan-to-be-seen hazard must be 
Instruction No. 25 has been 
for injuries sustained after 
horsed halter and the horse 
case law in support of the 
avoided, in a case involving plaintiffs suit 
plaintiff was requested to untangle defendant's 
reared and struck plaintiff. The Court affirmed the trial court's entry of 
summary judgment based upon the following principle: 
Where there is a dangerous condition 6n one's property, which 
is just as observable to an invitee as to the owner, the owner has 
no duty to warn or to protect the invitee except to observe the 
universal standard of reasonable care under the circumstances. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Plaintiff argues that the well-established 
instruction was decided prior to comparative negligence, and is, therefore, 
inapplicable. 
Any assertion that the plain-to-be-seen theory is inapplicable as a result 
of the advent of comparative negligence is manifestly incorrect. In Allen >/. 
United States of America, 588 F.Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), where twenty-four 
plaintiffs brought an action against the United States under the Federal Tort 
Claims Act for cancer allegedly caused by atomic energy testing, the court 
stated as follows: 
The law expects people to take action^ on their own to protect 
themselves from evident and obvious dangers. Ordinarily one has 
the the duty to do so. See, e .g . PollescHe v . K-Mart Enterprises 
of Utah, Inc. , 520 P.2d 200 (Utah 1974), Whitman v . W. T. Grant 
Co . , 16 UtaFi 2d 81, 395 P.2d 916 (1964). 
Id. at 355. 
11 
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In Moore v . Burton Lumber £ Hardware Co. , 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), 
defendant appealed from a jury's special verdict finding both plaintiff and 
defendant negligent. However, under comparative negligence, the jury found 
plaintiffs negligence to not have been a cause of the injury. Defendant's 
motion for a new trial was denied. Ironically, the Court held that the trial 
court should have instructed the jury that there was no duty to warn an 
invitee of an obvious danger, citing Ellertson ^ . Dansie, supra, but held the 
failure to give such an instruction was harmless error. The Court's analysis 
of the plain-to-be-seen doctrine is substantially similar to Instruction No. 25 
as follows: 
There are, of course, certain risks which anyone of adult age must 
be taken to appreciate. Wold v . Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 
P.2d 453 (1953); Prosser TTajhdbook of the"Taw of Torts (4th Ed.) 
§ 61 P. 394, see also § 68 P. 448. H f t T i s l o n g been held that a 
property owner has no obligation to warn an invitee of dangers 
which are are known to the invitee or which are so obvious and 
apparent that he may be reasonably expected to discover them. 
Defendant specifically contends that the evidence supported its 
theory that the dangers were obvious and that the defendant, 
therefore, had no duty to warn plaintiff of such dangers. 
Id. at 868. The Court further noted that the jury's special verdict responses 
were consistent only when the injury was deemed to have resulted from a 
non-obvious danger, and, therefore, found that it was harmless error to fail 
to instruct the jury that defendant had no duty to warn of obvious dangers. 
Plaintiffs reliance upon case law from other jurisdictions is not 
controlling in this appeal. Similarly, plaintiffs recitation of the universally 
recognized standard of care in the law of torts, is not inconsistent with 
Instruction No. 25. Moreover, plaintiffs attempt to characterize Instruction 
No. 25 as imposing a duty to see and avoid a hazard which supersedes 
12 
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plaintiffs exercise of reasonable case is contrary to the express terms of the 
instruction. 
In the present case, plaintiff arrived prior to normal business hours and 
quite a bit earlier than anyone else, except a CSB employee that was already 
sanding and salting the lot at the time plaintiff arrived. CSB is not an 
insurer against all accidents that occur on its premises and insufficient time 
had elapsed to correct any potentially dangerbus conditions and plaintiffs 
concession that the ice was not only readily observable, but had in fact been 
observed by plaintiff, refutes any assertion tnat the ice was a dangerous 
condition unknown to plaintiff. Accordingly, Instruction No. 25 was an 
appropriate Instruction to be read at trial, since it accurately summarizes 
Utah law. Furthermore, the jury affidavits obtained and submitted by plaintiff 
are patently inadequate to impeach the jury vercflict. 
CONCLUSION 
Overwhelming evidence introduced at tria 
verdict, including evidence which showed tha^ it was unreasonable to not 
avoid the ice on the fourth level of the parfking lot early on a Monday 
morning following a snowstorm, and that CSB had not acted unreasonably 
in maintaining the parking lot. Jury Instruction No. 25 is an accurate 
restatement of current Utah law despite the advent of comparative negligence, 
and plaintiffs own testimony at trial established that the icy conditions were 
well-known to plaintiff and constituted an obvious or plainly seen dangerous 
condition within the meaning of Instruction No. 25. Moreover, plaintiffs 
attempt to impeach the jury verdict through thje 
supports the juryfs special 
e affidavits of Mr. Sweet and 
13 
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Ms. Etcheverry was improper, since the juror 's aff idavits do not allege that 
the verdict was obtained by chance or b r ibe ry . 
In conclusion, in the instant case the dismissal of the appeal is clearly 
just i f ied based upon its spuriousness, the waste of judicial resources and the 
unreasonable demands on this Court which result from seeking a new tr ial on 
an issue already decided by the j u r y , heard by the tr ia l court on the motion 
for a new tr ia l and brought before this Court on the present appeal. 
I t i s , therefore, respectful ly submitted that p la in t i f f s appeal should be 
dismissed. 
DATED this £ 0 day of November, 1986. 
/] 
Donald J . Purser 
J . Angus Edwards 
FOWLER 8 PURSER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake C i ty , Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Commercial Security Bank 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cer t i fy that on the ^ j J <day of November, 1986, I served the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent upon the fol lowing, by depositing 4 copies 
thereof in the United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Robert A. Echard 
635 - 25th Street 
Ogden, UT 84401 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 59. New Trials; Amendments of Judgment 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 , a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any 
of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial 
in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has 
been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and 
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry 
of new judgment; 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings tif the court, jury or adverse 
party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which 
either party was prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the 
jurors have been induced to assent to anyj 
to a finding on any question submitted to 
to a determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct 
general or special verdict, or 
them by the court, by resort 
[of the jurors. 
nary prudence could not have 
may be proved by the affidavit of any one 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordi 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the 
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have 
discovered and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
267m 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; Time for Filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under subdivision (a ) (1 ) , ( 2 ) , ( 3 ) , or (4 ) , it shall be supported by 
affidavit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they 
shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such 
service within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the 
affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an 
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause 
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply 
affidavits. 
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry of 
judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason 
for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the 
order shall specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend 
the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
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INSTRUCTION Hp. 2 3 
Ordinarily, a Plaintiff in any krtion has the duty of 
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is plainly 
visible, and if the Plaintiff reasonably flailed to do so, then 
the Plaintiff is negligent either in facing to look or in 
failing to heed what he or she saw. 
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